Making sense of misfortune: Deservingness, self-esteem, and patterns of self-defeat. by Callan, Mitchell J et al.
PERSONALITY PROCESSES AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
Making Sense of Misfortune:
Deservingness, Self-Esteem, and Patterns of Self-Defeat
Mitchell J. Callan
University of Essex
Aaron C. Kay
Duke University
Rael J. Dawtry
University of Kent
Drawing on theorizing and research suggesting that people are motivated to view their world as an
orderly and predictable place in which people get what they deserve, the authors proposed that (a) random
and uncontrollable bad outcomes will lower self-esteem and (b) this, in turn, will lead to the adoption of
self-defeating beliefs and behaviors. Four experiments demonstrated that participants who experienced or
recalled bad (vs. good) breaks devalued their self-esteem (Studies 1a and 1b), and that decrements in
self-esteem (whether arrived at through misfortune or failure experience) increase beliefs about deserving
bad outcomes (Studies 1a, 1b, 2a, 2b). Five studies (Studies 3–7) extended these findings by showing that
this, in turn, can engender a wide array of self-defeating beliefs and behaviors, including claimed
self-handicapping ahead of an ability test (Study 3), the preference for others to view the self less
favorably (Studies 4–5), chronic self-handicapping and thoughts of physical self-harm (Study 6), and
choosing to receive negative feedback during an ability test (Study 7). The current findings highlight the
important role that concerns about deservingness play in the link between lower self-esteem and patterns
of self-defeating beliefs and behaviors. The theoretical and practical implications of these findings are
discussed.
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Most people can remember an occasion when through bad luck
or bad timing they experienced a negative outcome, such as ending
up on the losing side of a coin flip, failing an important task despite
their best intentions and efforts, or accidently causing someone
else harm or embarrassment. Anecdotal observation and experi-
mental evidence suggest that such negative experiences, despite
being unintended and unforeseeable, often elicit feelings of guilt
and sadness (e.g., Freedman, Wallington, & Bless, 1967; McGraw,
1987; Meindl & Lerner, 1984; Miller & Gunasegaram, 1990).
Perhaps even more intriguing and puzzling is research showing
that people may be so moved by these experiences that they will
even devalue themselves (e.g., Apsler & Friedman, 1975; Rubin &
Peplau, 1973), selectively remember their personal shortcomings
(Callan, Kay, Davidenko, & Ellard, 2009), or cause harm to
themselves (e.g., Comer & Laird, 1975; Ferrari, 1990; Walster,
Aronson, & Brown, 1966; for a review, see Baumeister & Scher,
1988). For instance, Comer and Laird (1975) found that a large
majority of their participants who were randomly assigned to
suffer an ill-fate (i.e., to eat a live worm) later chose to suffer the
same ill-fate even when they were given the opportunity to opt for
a less aversive outcome. In a similar vein, innocent victims of
extreme injustices (e.g., rape victims) sometimes try to breathe
meaning into their experiences by devaluing, or somehow finding
fault in, themselves (Davis, Lehman, Silver, Wortman, & Ellard,
1996; Hall, French, & Marteau, 2003; Janoff-Bulman, 1992;
Littleton, Magee, & Axsom, 2007; Miller & Porter, 1983).
Such self-defeating beliefs and behaviors following experiences
of random negative outcomes are as surprising as they are seem-
ingly irrational. Indeed, societal conventions governing the assign-
ment of responsibility and blame generally absolve anyone of
culpability when negative outcomes are unintended, unforesee-
able, or uncontrollable (see Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 1995). Thus, by
commonly accepted standards, people ought not to condemn them-
selves for negative outcomes brought about by chance or factors
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beyond their control. Moreover, these self-defeating beliefs and
behaviors are seemingly at odds with the prevailing view that
humans are fundamentally motivated to both maximize pleasure
and minimize pain (Schwartz, 1986; Wilson, 1978) and generally
view themselves in as positive a light as possible (Leary, 2007;
Sedikides & Gregg, 2008). Why, then, would people be willing to
devalue or punish themselves for outcomes that they, by all rea-
sonable accounts, did not cause?
The notion that people may, at times, adopt self-defeating be-
liefs and behaviors following negative experiences may become
less of a paradox in light of what we know about the psychology
of deservingness (Feather, 1999; Hafer, 2011; Jost & Kay, 2010;
Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976; Major, 1994). Specifically, the-
orizing and research—much of it originating with Lerner’s (1980)
Just World Theory—indicates that people need to maintain the
belief that the world is basically an orderly, non-random place
where people—including ourselves—get what they deserve and
deserve what they get (Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Lerner, 1980).
Because maintaining deservingness beliefs serves an adaptive
function (Callan, Harvey, Dawtry, & Sutton, 2013; Hafer, 2000;
Laurin, Fitzsimons, & Kay, 2011; Lerner, 1977), people often
rationalize their experiences, even unjust ones, in order to maintain
perceptions of deservingness (for reviews, see Callan & Ellard,
2010; Hafer & Bègue, 2005; Jost & Kay, 2010; Lerner, 1980).
That is, they often go to great lengths to maintain their beliefs that
rewards and punishments are not haphazard but are doled out
according to an understandable set of rules (Kay, Gaucher, Napier,
Callan, & Laurin, 2008). Might this theoretical perspective—
which emphasizes a powerful human motive to view outcomes as
deserved rather than random—contribute to our understanding of
self-defeating beliefs and behaviors?
To answer this question, we leveraged classic and contemporary
theory and research to shed light on one potential mechanism
underlying self-defeating beliefs and behaviors among “normal,”
nonclinical samples. We adopted Baumeister and Scher’s (1988)
definition of self-defeating behavior as “any deliberate or inten-
tional behavior that has clear, definitely or probably negative
effects on the self or the self’s projects” (p. 3). Specifically, we
tested the general idea that, to the extent people are motivated to
view the world as an orderly place that conforms to rules of
deservingness, they might adopt various self-defeating beliefs and
behaviors (e.g., self-handicapping, thoughts of self-harm, choosing
to self-punish) following the experience of misfortune because
people feel compelled to view misfortune—even though, by def-
inition, it is uncontrollable—as deserved.
In one of the earliest treatments of Just World Theory, Lerner et
al. (1976) defined “deserving” as a judgment that follows the
perception of an appropriate relation between the value of people
or their actions and the value of their outcomes (see also Feather,
1999). By this characterization, bad outcomes, for example, are
deemed deserved by virtue of who the recipients are (bad people)
or what they have done (bad deeds). Research has confirmed that
observers judge bad (good) people as deserving of their fortuitous
bad (good) fortunes (e.g., Callan, Sutton, Harvey, & Dawtry, 2014;
Pepitone & L’Armand, 1996; Rice & Trafimow, 2011), and the
innocent suffering of devalued (vs. valued) individuals and groups
as less unfair (e.g., Callan, Dawtry, & Olson, 2012; Callan, Powell,
& Ellard, 2007; Correia, Vala, & Aguiar, 2007; Lerner & Agar,
1972). Crucially, people also expect bad (good) things to happen to
bad (good) people (e.g., Callan, Ferguson, & Bindemann, 2013;
Kaplowitz, 1979). For example, Callan, Ellard, and Nicol (2006)
found that participants rated a man who cheated on his wife as
more deserving of a completely unrelated car accident than par-
ticipants who learned the man did not cheat. Further, early exper-
imental evidence revealed that observers can satisfy their motive to
view outcomes as driven by deservingness by inferring others’
moral worth simply on the basis of their fortuitously experienced
good or bad outcomes (e.g., Apsler & Friedman, 1975; Lerner,
1965; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; see Lerner & Miller, 1978). That
is, people appear fundamentally motivated to view that bad (good)
things happen to bad (good) people.
These findings highlight the role that a concern for deserving-
ness plays in people’s reactions to the fates of others. Might the
same processes operate in the context of considering one’s own
outcomes and self-worth? That is, might people over-apply models
of deservingness to explain their own seemingly chance fortunes?
If so, we would expect people to literally feel worse about their
self-worth—that is, evidence lower self-esteem—after experienc-
ing misfortune. Consistent with this, research has shown that
people devalue (or enhance) their attributes and self-esteem when
chance negative (or positive) outcomes occur (e.g., Apsler &
Friedman, 1975; Callan, Kay, et al., 2009; Dion & Dion, 1987;
Ellard & Bates, 1990; Janoff-Bulman, 1992; Rubin & Peplau,
1973). For example, in a natural experiment, Rubin and Peplau
(1973) found that young men who learned through a random draft
lottery that they would likely be drafted to serve in Vietnam
significantly lowered their self-esteem compared to men who
learned they would likely not be drafted. As Lerner argued (1998;
see also Lerner & Clayton, 2011), such experiences of good or bad
fortunes, however fortuitous they might be, can lead to corre-
sponding changes in self-evaluations, due to the application of
“causal schemas or scripts that initially appeared very early in
[people’s] lives and persist throughout adulthood—bad outcomes
are caused by bad people” (Lerner, 1998, p. 255). That is, the
motive to believe that people get what they deserve, Lerner theo-
rized, can lead people to justify their current negative experiences
by devaluing, or finding fault, in themselves.
Theoretically, though, this psychological chain may not end
here. That is, to the extent people are in fact motivated to view the
world this way, not only should their views of self-worth be
affected by the misfortunes that befall them, but their feelings of
self-worth should affect what they feel they deserve. Indeed, a
handful of studies suggest that people lower in self-esteem feel
more deserving of bad outcomes (Feather, 2006; Heuer, Blumen-
thal, Douglas, & Weinblatt, 1999; Wood, Heimpel, Manwell, &
Whittington, 2009). For example, Wood et al. (2009) found that
participants who were either situationally or chronically low in
self-esteem felt that they did not deserve to experience positive
emotions. However, although deservingness has long been in-
voked as a mechanism to explain people’s responses to their own
good or bad outcomes, it has rarely been measured directly. In
Wood et al.’s words, “such studies have not measured participants’
sense of deservingness, so we cannot be sure that deservingness
was important” (p. 364). Moreover, little research has been fo-
cused on the variety of potential self-defeating beliefs and behav-
iors than can arise from people’s beliefs that they deserve bad
outcomes in life, and none has focused on this collection of
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processes in the context of outcomes that individuals have little
control over.
Integrating these various theoretical approaches, we test the
general hypotheses that self-esteem (a) will be impacted by the
experience of random (mis)fortune, (b) will lead to corresponding
changes in feelings of deservingness, and (c) will lead people to
adopt self-defeating beliefs and engage in self-defeating behaviors.
What is more, across 7 studies that adopt various experimental and
correlational designs, we illustrate the feasibility of a causal chain
that begins with the experience of random (mis)fortune and, by
way of corresponding changes in self-esteem and feelings of
deservingness, ends in the adoption of self-defeating beliefs and
behaviors.
The conceptual framework for our studies is outlined in Figure
1. The variables we manipulated or measured for each of the 7
studies are shown with solid lines under the figure. By way of
summary, in Studies 1a and 1b, we examine the effects of expe-
riencing/recalling breaks on state self-esteem and beliefs about
deserving bad outcomes. In Studies 2a and 2b, we manipulate state
self-esteem to determine the causal role of state self-esteem in
producing changes in beliefs about deserving bad outcomes. In
Studies 3a and 3b, we examined the effects of experiencing/
recalling bad breaks on self-handicapping. In Study 4, we exam-
ined the effect of recalling bad breaks on preferred appraisals by
close others. In Studies 5–7, we examined the mediating role of
beliefs about deserving bad outcomes in the link between trait
self-esteem and preferred appraisals by others (Study 5), chronic
self-handicapping (Study 6), thoughts of self-harm (Study 6), and
choosing to self-punish (Study 7). Across of all these studies, then,
we aimed to demonstrate (a) that people’s need to view their world
as just and predictable—that is, as one in which outcomes, good
and bad, are distributed to those who deserve them—can engender
a wide array of self-defeating beliefs and behaviors; (b) that
self-esteem plays a key role in this process; and (c) that because of
a concern for deservingness, even random and mundane misfor-
tunes are sufficient to trigger this chain of events.
Studies 1A and 1B: Effects of Good/Bad Breaks on
Self-Esteem and Deservingness of Bad Outcomes
We first examined the effects of experiencing or recalling
random bad breaks on self-esteem and corresponding beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes. To the extent that people are
motivated to believe the world is an orderly place where people
get what they deserve, experiencing/recalling bad (vs. good)
breaks should lead people to devalue their state self-esteem,
because self-esteem may be an indicator of how good versus
bad breaks are being internalized and perceived as reflecting
directly on the self. Past research suggests this should be the
case (see Lerner, 1998). What is not known, however, is the
consequences of these changes in state self-esteem for people’s
subsequent perceptions of what they deserve in their immediate
future. In these two studies, we aimed to establish empirically
that reductions in positive state self-esteem arising from the
experience of random bad breaks translate into increased beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes in the future. If people are
motivated to believe that bad (good) people deserve bad (good)
outcomes (Lerner, 1980), then changes in self-esteem should
lead to concomitant changes in beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes. The belief that one deserves bad outcomes, by def-
inition (Lerner et al., 1976), requires a less favorable view of
the self— bad people deserve bad outcomes. Therefore, we
propose that self-evaluations causally precede specific deserv-
ingness beliefs that, in turn, affect self-defeating beliefs and
behaviors.
After either experiencing a bad (vs. good) break (Study 1a) or
recalling recent bad (vs. good) breaks (Study 1b), participants
completed a state self-esteem scale and a scale designed to mea-
sure the extent to which they believed they deserved bad outcomes.
We hypothesized that the effect of experiencing/recalling bad
breaks on increased beliefs about deserving bad outcomes would
be mediated by changes in state self-esteem. One possible alter-
native account of this prediction is that instead of specific changes
in self-evaluations, recalling/experiencing bad versus good breaks
lead to changes in affect that, in turn, “infuse” into judgments of
deserving bad outcomes (e.g., Forgas, 1995). Thus, we also mea-
sured positive and negative affect to ascertain the specific medi-
ating role of state self-esteem in the effect of experiencing/recall-
ing bad versus good breaks on beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes, conditional on the potential mediating role of general
affects.
Method
Study 1a.
Participants. We approached 76 people at various locations
around the University of Essex, United Kingdom, campus to
complete a “personality study.” Data from two participants were
not included in analyses because they inadvertently completed the
manipulation procedure after the dependent measures. The result-
ing sample composed 30 males and 43 females (1 unreported;
Mage  25.22 years, SDage  11.26). Participants were given a
small candy bar and £3 for their participation.
Materials and procedure. After initially agreeing to take part
in the study for a small candy bar, participants were presented a
questionnaire package, the cover sheet of which contained a con-
Figure 1. Conceptual framework for the studies. Solid lines show the
variables that were measured or manipulated for each study. The specific
self-defeating beliefs or behaviors measured in Studies 3a–7 are noted on
the right-hand side of the figure.
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sent form and, underneath, an introduction to a “Peel n’ Reveal
Lottery” (PnR). Participants learned that as an additional incentive
for their participation, we were giving them the opportunity to win
or “lose” £3. Beneath the instructions was a rectangular box
covered by a plain white sticky label (25 mm  50 mm), mounted
over clear tape to prevent tearing, with a colored pull tab protrud-
ing from the right hand side. Participants were told to peel off the
tab to discover if they won or lost. Peeling off the label revealed
text underneath reading either WIN or LOSE. This served as our
manipulation of a random good or bad break. Blind to the exper-
imenter, WIN and LOSE questionnaires were randomly distributed
to participants (all participants were eventually paid £3 regardless
of the outcome of the lottery).
On the following page participants were asked: “For our re-
cords, please indicate whether you won or lost the Peel n’ Reveal
Lottery,” and were required to circle the appropriate response
(WON or LOST). Immediately after affirming the good or bad
break, participants completed a state version of Rosenberg’s
(1965) Self-Esteem Scale (SES; e.g., “Right now, I feel that I am
a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others”;   .85).
Embedded within the SES were three items designed to measure
participants’ beliefs about deserving bad outcomes: “Right now, I
believe I am deserving of all the good things life has to offer”
(reverse-scored); “Right now, I do not feel deserving of positive
outcomes”; and “Right now, I feel I deserve good luck.”1 Partic-
ipants responded to all items using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Participants also completed 7 positive (e.g., excited, happy,
satisfied, cheerful, encouraged, joyous, relaxed;   .88) and 9
negative (e.g., distressed, upset, afraid, guilty, scared, angry,
ashamed, irritable, sad;   .85) items from the Positive and
Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen,
1988). Participants rated the extent to which they were presently
experiencing each of the 16 emotions on a 6-point scale (1  not
at all, 6  very much).
Study 1b.
Participants. We recruited participants online (N  218,
45% male; Mage  31.28 years, SDage  11.92) using Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk; Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling,
2011).
Materials and procedure. Participants learned that the study
concerned “aspects of personality and daily experiences.” They
first completed a survey of a “content analysis of life experiences”
where they were asked to recall either 4 good breaks or 4 bad
breaks (cf. Gaucher, Hafer, Kay, & Davidenko, 2010). Participants
read:
For this part of the survey, we’re interested in people’s life experi-
ences. Specifically, we’re currently interested in learning about the
kinds of good [bad] breaks people experience in their lives. “Good
breaks” [“Bad breaks”] are those sorts of positive [negative] experi-
ences we have that we do not intend, expect, or plan to occur—they
just happen to us. Please list below 4 good [bad] breaks that you have
experienced in your life.
Next, participants completed a state version of Rosenberg’s SES
(  .94), a six-item Deservingness of Bad Outcomes Scale
(DBOS; see Table 1), and the PANAS items from Study 1 (s 
.91). Shown in Table 1, the items for the DBOS were adapted and
extended from scales constructed by Wood et al. (2009). The items
were written to reflect participants’ beliefs about deserving bad
and good outcomes (with the items framed in terms of good
outcomes reverse scored). All six items from the DBOS loaded
onto a single principal component (eigenvalue  4.03, 67.12% of
the variance accounted for) and the scale demonstrated acceptable
internal consistency (  .91).
Results
Shown in Table 2, independent samples t-tests showed that
participants who experienced a bad (vs. good) break during the
PnR (Study 1a) significantly viewed themselves more negatively
and believed they were more deserving of bad outcomes (the good
and bad break conditions were coded as 0 and 1, respectively, for
both Studies 1a and 2b). One participant from the bad breaks
condition reported exceptionally low self-esteem (studentized de-
leted residual  4.64; Cook’s D that was 7.54 SD above the mean
of Cook’s D in these analyses) and was not included in this
analysis. Including this datum results in a stronger effect of breaks
on self-esteem, t(72)  2.57, p  .01, d  0.61.
Similarly, in Study 1b, independent samples t-tests showed that
participants who recalled bad breaks had lower state self-esteem
and more strongly believed they deserved bad outcomes compared
to participants who recalled good breaks. The effect of experi-
enced/recalled breaks on positive and negative affect was mixed
across Studies 1a and 1b, with participants feeling significantly
more negative affect when they recalled bad (vs. good) breaks in
Study 1b.
Separately for Studies 1a and 1b, we used Preacher and Hayes’s
(2008) multiple mediation bootstrapping procedure (10,000 resa-
mples) to test the indirect effects of the good/bad breaks manipu-
lations on deserving bad outcomes through self-esteem, negative
affect, and positive affect. Analysis revealed bias-corrected and
accelerated 95% confidence intervals (95% BCa CI) of .05 and .50
(total effect  .30; indirect effect  .27, SE  .11) and .15 to .64
(total effect  .40; indirect effect  .38, SE  .13) for self-esteem
for Studies 1a and 1b, respectively. Neither negative affect nor
positive affect significantly mediated the effect of experiencing/
recalling bad breaks on deserving bad outcomes for either study
(indirect effects ranged from –.01 to 04, all confidence intervals
crossed zero). These analyses suggest that, as predicted, lower
state self-esteem mediates the effect of experiencing/recalling bad
(vs. good) breaks on increased beliefs about deserving bad out-
comes. A similar pattern was not observed for positive and nega-
tive affect, suggesting that general affect does not mediate the
effect of experiencing/recalling bad breaks on beliefs about de-
serving bad outcomes in the same way as state self-esteem.
1 A principal component analysis of the three deservingness items re-
vealed that the last item (“I feel I deserve good luck”) did not load with the
other two items (loading  .24 vs. .76 and .82). The item also did not
significantly correlate with either the average of the other two deserving-
ness items (r  .04, p  .73) or the SES (r  .18, p  .13) and was
therefore dropped from the Deservingness of Bad Outcomes Scale. This
scale was extended and improved in our subsequent studies (see Table 1).
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Studies 2A and 2B: Self-Esteem and Deservingness of
Outcomes
Studies 1a and 1b revealed that experiencing/recalling bad (vs.
good) breaks reduced participants’ state self-esteem which, in turn,
increased their beliefs about deserving subsequent bad outcomes.
Although this mediation pattern conformed to our predictions, the
causal direction between self-esteem and beliefs about deserving
bad outcomes could not be determined because both constructs
were assessed simultaneously. Our theoretical perspective suggests
that, by definition, to believe that one deserves bad outcomes
requires a less favorable view of the self (Lerner et al., 1976). In
Table 1
Scale Items, Principal Component Loadings, and Communalities for the Beliefs About Deserving
Bad Outcomes Scales
Scale items
Component
loading Communality
6-item State Deservingness of Bad Outcomes Scale (Studies 1b and 2b)
1. Right now, I’d like to feel better about myself than I usually do, but
deep down, I don’t feel I deserve to. .75 .56
2. I feel unworthy of succeeding right now. .87 .75
3. Right now, I feel I deserve to fail in life. .88 .77
4. Right now, I feel that I deserve all of the good things life has to offer.a .74 .55
5. Right now, I feel I deserve to do poorly in life. .86 .75
6. Right now, I feel I deserve to do well in life.a .81 .65
Deservingness of Failing Ability Test Scale (Study 3b)
1. I feel that I deserve to do well on the ability test.a .68 .46
2. I feel that I deserve to do poorly on the ability test. .78 .62
3. Right now, I feel deserving of all the good things life has to offer.a .71 .51
4. I feel I have a good shot at achieving a good score on the ability test.a .84 .70
5. I feel confident about my ability to perform well on the ability test.a .82 .67
6. I feel that I deserve to fail this ability test. .81 .65
7. Right now, I do not feel deserving of positive outcomes. .76 .57
9-item Deservingness of Bad Outcomes Scale (Studies 5, 6, and 7 collated)
1. I feel that I deserve all of the good things life has to offer.a .64 .60
2. I feel that I deserve to do poorly in life. .73 .58
3. I often feel unworthy of my successes. .76 .57
4. I often feel deserving of my failures. .73 .66
5. When I suffer a setback, I sometimes think that I had it coming to me. .71 .73
6. I feel that I deserve to do well in life.a .70 .76
7. I often feel that I deserve the good breaks that happen to me.a .70 .70
8. I often feel that I deserve the bad breaks that happen to me. .69 .63
9. I’d like to feel better about myself than I usually do, but deep down, I
don’t feel I deserve to. .64 .51
a Reverse scored.
Table 2
Means and Standard Deviations for the Measures Employed in Studies 1a and 1b by Breaks Conditions and Intercorrelations Among
the Measures
Measures
Breaks manipulation Intercorrelations
Bad breaks Good breaks t d 1 2 3 4
Study 1a: Experienced breaks
1. Self-esteem 4.68 (0.61) 5.01 (0.61) 2.35 0.56 —
2. Deserve bad outcomes 2.16 (0.80) 1.80 (0.72) 2.06 0.49 .70 —
3. Negative affect 1.58 (0.64) 1.66 (0.67) 0.56 0.13 .17 .03 —
4. Positive affect 3.39 (0.78) 3.60 (0.75) 1.20 0.28 .38 .40 .46 —
Study 1b: Recalled breaks
1. Self-esteem 4.32 (1.24) 4.78 (0.91) 3.18 0.43 [.94]
2. Deserve bad outcomes 2.41 (1.15) 2.00 (.88) 2.93 0.40 .84 [.91]
3. Negative affect 1.69 (0.79) 1.42 (0.67) 2.76 0.38 .61 .52 [.92]
4. Positive affect 2.82 (1.07) 3.10 (1.08) 1.91 0.26 .64 .51 .41 [.93]
Note. Higher values indicate more of each construct (e.g., higher self-esteem). Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. Alpha reliabilities are
presented in brackets.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
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Studies 2a and 2b, then, we tested this process directly by adopting
an experimental-causal-chain approach to testing psychological
process, which involves manipulating the proposed mediator (self-
esteem) to show changes in the focal outcome variable (deserv-
ingness; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). In Study 2a, we manip-
ulated self-esteem by informing participants that they “failed” or
“succeeded” an intelligence test via a false feedback manipulation
(e.g., Cameron, Holmes, & Vorauer, 2009; Dodgson & Wood,
1998; Hayes, Schimel, & Williams, 2008). Participants then rated
the fairness and reasonableness of a subsequent random good or
bad break. We expected that participants who “succeeded” in the
test would rate the random outcome as more fair when they
experienced a good (vs. bad) break. This “positivity bias” (Mezu-
lis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Taylor & Brown, 1988),
however, should be significantly dampened when participants
learned they “failed” the test. Put differently, given our theoretical
perspective, participants who “failed” the intelligence test should
perceive the good (bad) break as less (more) fair than participants
who “succeed” the test.
If people are motivated to maintain an appropriate relation
between their personal worth and the value of their (even random)
outcomes, then participants situationally low (high) in self-esteem
should judge a random bad (good) break as more fair and reason-
able. In Study 2b, participants listed the attributes they least liked
about themselves (vs. control; Wood et al., 2009) and then rated
the extent to which they believed they deserved bad outcomes in
life. We predicted that participants who thought about and listed
their least favorable qualities and attributes (vs. participants who
thought about “neutral” aspects of their lives) would believe they
were more deserving of bad outcomes.
Method
Study 2a.
Participants. Ninety students from the University of Essex
participated in a laboratory experiment for £4 (plus £3, see below).
Seven participants were not included in analyses because they did
not complete the PnR procedure at the correct time or were
suspicious of the feedback they received about their non-verbal
reasoning ability. The resulting sample consisted of 83 participants
(43.4% male, 1.2% unreported; Mage  25.79 years, SDage 
5.31).
Materials and procedure.
Feedback manipulation. Participants learned that the study
concerned assessing non-verbal reasoning. They first completed
what was ostensibly a computer-based non-verbal reasoning
(NVR) test, which was in fact an elaborate Microsoft PowerPoint
presentation and formed our success or failure feedback manipu-
lation. Participants were first presented with an instruction screen
describing that they were required to solve Raven’s matrices under
a time constraint of 30 s per matrix. Participants were informed
that response times were used in calculating their score, and that
missing responses would be treated as incorrect. These instructions
were intended to encourage participants to respond quickly and to
make a response on every trial, which in turn was expected to
make it more difficult for participants to accurately judge their
absolute level of performance on the task. Participants were also
informed that, “responses will be automatically cross-referenced
with population data at the end of the task in order to calculate
your standardized NVR score, and you will receive feedback on
your performance.”
Participants then completed a series of 24 matrices, presented
one per slide, selected from Raven’s (1938) Standard Progressive
Matrices, eight of which were judged to be relatively easy, eight
intermediate, and eight difficult. Matrices were presented in order
of increasing difficulty. On each trial participants were required to
identify the correct missing piece and respond by clicking the
corresponding number on an on-screen number pad underneath the
matrix set. The number pad consisted of animated buttons labeled
1–8. Clicking any button caused the presentation to advance to the
next slide, or the presentation would automatically advance after
30 s. A decreasing timer bar at the bottom of the screen showed the
remaining time available for each trial.
After completing the 24th trial, participants were presented
with a screen displaying a loading bar with a caption that read:
“Accessing Database. Please Wait,” and after a few seconds,
“Calculating Standardised NVR Score. Please Wait.” Partici-
pants were then presented with a screen providing performance
feedback. The feedback information indicated the test popula-
tion against which the participants’ score was compared (Uni-
versity Students), the average for the test population (100) and
the participants own score; arbitrarily 77 in the failure feedback
condition, or 122 in the success feedback condition. The screen
also displayed a normal distribution curve indicating the per-
centages of scores for the test population falling 1– 4 SDs above
and below the mean. An arrow on the figure indicated the
position of the participants’ score on the distribution, showing
that it fell in either the bottom 16% (failure feedback) or top
16% (success feedback) of scores (see Figure 2).
After viewing their feedback, participants called the experi-
menter back into the room and were asked whether they needed
assistance in interpreting their feedback. Regardless of participants
response, the experimenter pointed out the participants score and
the population mean, and informed them that their score was “very
good (not so good), it puts you in the top (bottom) 16 odd percent
of scores for the test population.” This was primarily intended to
ensure that participants had understood the feedback, and was also
expected to reinforce the impact of the manipulation by making the
score public to the experimenter, and by ensuring that participants
perceived their performance to be good or bad in relation to their
peers.
Good/bad break manipulation. Participants were then asked
to take part in an unexpected questionnaire study on “person-
ality,” which involved “some questions regarding our experi-
mental procedures and a short personality inventory.” The
questionnaire also introduced the manipulation of a good versus
bad break. Participants were verbally informed that “as the
study was unexpected, and we may overrun the advertised time
a little, we are going to give you the chance to win an extra £3
compensation.” Participants were then presented with a stack of
20 questionnaires and asked to pick one at random. Those in the
good break (bad break) condition were informed that 30%
(70%) of the questionnaires were winners. In actuality, as
participants were pre-assigned to either a good or bad break, all
of the questionnaires presented were either win or lose. This
instruction was intended to potentially increase the impact of
the breaks manipulation by indicating that the subsequent win
or loss was against the odds. Participants then chose a ques-
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tionnaire package, the top sheet of which included the PnR
lottery procedure from Study 1a.
Participants then completed a questionnaire entitled “Exper-
imental Feedback Form,” ostensibly so that we could “better
understand participants’ experience of taking part in our re-
search and improve upon procedure in future studies.” Before
completing the items on the questionnaire, participants were
asked to circle whether they won or lost the PnR lottery.
Participants then answered the following six questions regard-
ing the fairness/reasonableness of the PnR procedure: “How fair
did you find the Peel n’ Reveal procedure used to decide
whether you would receive extra compensation” (1  extremely
unfair, 9  extremely fair); “How unreasonable to reasonable
do you think the Peel n’ Reveal procedure is as a means of
deciding whether participants will receive extra compensation”
(1  extremely unreasonable, 9  extremely reasonable); “To
what extent did you feel unfortunate to fortunate with the
outcome of the Peel n’ Reveal Lottery” (1  very unfortunate,
9  very fortunate); “To what extent do you feel that you will
receive reasonable compensation for your time in the lab today”
(1  not at all, 9  a great deal); “To what extent did you feel
dissatisfied to satisfied with the outcome of the Peel n’ Reveal
Lottery” (1  very dissatisfied, 9  very satisfied) and “To
what extent do you feel that the outcome of the Peel n’ Reveal
Lottery was deserved” (1  not at all, 9  a great deal). These
items were averaged to form a composite measure of how
fair/reasonable participants perceived the PnR procedure. All
six of these items loaded onto a single principal component
(eigenvalue  2.91, 48.45% of the variance accounted for; all
component loadings  .55) and showed acceptable internal
consistency (  .79). An additional component was extracted
from this analysis (eigenvalue  1.32) but inspection of the
loadings revealed no consistent or meaningful pattern among
the items (i.e., a mix of positive and negative loadings). Finally,
participants provided demographic information and the exper-
imenter reentered the booth to inform them that the study was
completed. Participants were probed for suspicion regarding the
feedback and break manipulations and extensively debriefed.
During the debriefing, participants in the failure feedback con-
dition also completed an exercise in which they were required
to write down several of their best qualities, which was intended
to alleviate any lasting influence of the false feedback manip-
ulation.
Study 2b.
Participants. We recruited participants online (N  190, 65%
male, 0.5% unreported; Mage  31.11 years, SDage  9.75) using
MTurk.
Materials and procedure. Participants learned that the study
concerned “personality, traits, and everyday experiences.” Rep-
resenting our manipulation of self-esteem (cf. Wood et al.,
2009), participants first completed a “content analysis survey”
about either their “personal attributes” (low self-esteem condi-
tion) or “daily experiences” (control condition). Participants
in the low self-esteem condition were asked to describe three
things that they least liked about themselves and describe what
the person who is closest to them would say are their worst two
traits. Participants in the control condition were asked to de-
scribe three “everyday” features of their average day at work
and what they wore yesterday and three days ago.
Next, participants completed the six-item DBOS used in Study
1b (s  .89). Finally, to reduce any negative effects of recall-
ing their worst traits, participants were asked to describe three
of the successes and/or achievements in their life they were
most proud of.
Figure 2. Feedback screen for the “failure” condition shown to participants at the end of the non-verbal
reasoning (NVR) test in Study 2. Participants in the “success” condition received a NVR score of 120.
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Results and Discussion
Perceived fairness/reasonableness of the PnR procedure
(Study 2a) was analyzed using a 2 (Test Performance Feedback:
failure vs. success)  2 (Experienced Break: good vs. bad)
analysis of variance (ANOVA). These analyses revealed a main
effect of breaks, F(1, 79)  24.49, p  .001, p2  .234, such
that participants who experienced a good break (won PnR)
perceived the PnR procedure as more fair and reasonable. There
was no significant main effect of feedback, F(1, 79)  0.16,
p  .69.
Shown in Figure 3, analyses revealed a Feedback  Breaks
interaction, F(1, 79)  6.02, p  .016, p2  .071.2 Follow-up
analyses showed that the effect of experiencing a good or bad
break on perceiving the PnR procedure as fair/reasonable was
weaker among participants who received failure feedback, t(79) 
1.78, p  .08, than among participants who received success
feedback, t(79)  5.20, p  .001.3
In Study 2b, participants who described their worst traits and the
things they least liked about themselves believed they were sig-
nificantly more deserving of bad outcomes (M 2.60, SD 1.13)
than participants in the control condition (M  2.21, SD  0.85),
t(188)  2.68, p  .008, d  0.39.
Using different manipulations of self-esteem and different mea-
sures of deserving bad outcomes, Studies 2a and 2b provided
converging experimental evidence for the causal role that self-
esteem plays in people’s beliefs about deserving subsequent bad
outcomes. Following our framework shown in Figure 1, we now
turn our attention to examining the role that personal deserving-
ness plays in the relations among self-esteem and self-
handicapping (Studies 3 and 6), wanting others to evaluate the self
negatively (Studies 4 and 5), thoughts of self-harm (Study 6), and
self-punishment (Study 7).
Studies 3A and 3B: Effects of Good/Bad Breaks on
Self-Handicapping
In Studies 3a and 3b, we tested whether beliefs about deserv-
ingness brought about by experiencing/recalling bad breaks affects
claimed self-handicapping. Self-handicapping involves claiming
or creating an excuse or disadvantage prior to performing a task
that may serve as a ready-made explanation in the event of failure
(for reviews, see Higgins, Snyder, & Berglas, 1990; Hirt & Mc-
Crea, 2002; Rhodewalt, 2008). Self-handicapping is believed to
serve a self-protective function because, in the short-term, it en-
ables people to maintain positive self-esteem in light of task failure
by attributing poor performance to a self-handicap instead of a lack
of ability. Although self-handicapping has these short-term attri-
butional benefits (Feick & Rhodewalt, 1997; McCrea & Hirt,
2001), it is ultimately self-defeating (Baumeister, 1997; McCrea &
Flamm, 2012; Zuckerman, Kieffer, & Knee, 1998; Zuckerman &
Tsai, 2005). As Baumeister (1997) noted, “what makes it qualify
as a self-defeating behavior is that self-handicapping objectively
increases the likelihood of failure” (p. 153). Moreover, Zuckerman
and Tsai (2005) found that, over time, chronic self-handicappers
were less well adjusted, reported an increase in substance abuse,
and were less intrinsically motivated at work. Many studies have
shown that lower self-esteem is related to increased self-
handicapping (e.g., Finez, Berjot, Rosnet, Cleveland, & Tice,
2012; Rhodewalt, 1990; Spalding & Hardin, 1999; Zuckerman &
Tsai, 2005). In Studies 3a and 3b, we tested the role that beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes play in this link between self-
esteem and self-handicapping. Specifically, using established ex-
perimental procedures (e.g., Hendrix & Hirt, 2009; McCrea &
Hirt, 2011), we tested whether participants experiencing/recalling
bad breaks (vs. good breaks) will engage in claimed self-
handicapping (e.g., feeling stressed and tired) prior to taking a test
purporting to assess their verbal intelligence (which is a meaning-
ful and important attribute for most people; Tice, 1991).
Study 3a
We first conducted an initial study to ascertain whether partic-
ipants who experienced a bad (vs. good) break claim excuses for
potential poor performance ahead of completing a standard non-
verbal reasoning (NVR) test (Raven, 1938). Tice (1991) found that
2 Although our analysis strategy was to perform these analyses on the
composite of the six items we measured, one reviewer wondered whether
the pattern we report here is similar for those items more specific to
fairness/deservingness. The same analyses using only the average of the
“fairness” and “deservingness” items (r .41, p .001) revealed the same
Feedback  Breaks interaction pattern, F(1, 79)  5.72, p  .019, p2 
.068.
3 Another way to articulate this interaction pattern is to transform the
Feedback  Breaks interaction into a main effect of the feedback manip-
ulation by reverse scoring the fair/reasonable scores within the good breaks
condition only and conducting the same 2  2 ANOVA as above (see
Abelson, 1995). Looking at the pattern of findings in this way, participants
who received failure feedback rated the bad/good break as more/less fair
(M  4.64, SD  1.61) than participants who received success feedback
(M  3.87, SD  1.70), F(1, 79)  6.02, p  .016, p2  .071. There was
no significant interaction in these analyses, F(1, 79)  0.16, p  .69,
indicating that the absolute effect of success versus failure on perceived
fairness was not significantly different between the good and bad breaks
conditions.
Figure 3. The effect of success versus failure feedback on the perceived
fairness/reasonableness of a random break as a function of the valence of
the experienced random break. Error bars show standard errors of the
means.
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whether people low or high in self-esteem engaged in more or less
behavioral self-handicapping ahead of an ability test (e.g., reduc-
ing practice) depended on whether the test was perceived as being
able to diagnose only success or only failure. Finez et al. (2012),
however, showed that this finding does not necessarily generalize
to claimed self-handicapping, with people lower in self-esteem
self-handicapping more regardless of whether a test of perfor-
mance was pitched as being meaningful for only success or only
failure. In Study 3a, then, participants completed the PnR lottery
procedure we used in Study 1a and were told they would complete
a NVR test. They were then given the opportunity to claim
mitigating factors for potential poor performance on the test.
Self-handicapping was operationalized as the extent to which
participants self-reported mitigating circumstances for their poten-
tial poor performance on the NVR test.
Study 3b
Study 3b was designed to extend Study 3a in two important
ways: First, our theoretical perspective suggests that perceived
deservingness of bad outcomes—in this case, deservingness of
failing an ability test—should be one process that underlies the
effect of the good/bad breaks on self-handicapping. In Study 3b, in
addition to manipulating recalled bad/good breaks and measuring
claimed self-handicapping, we assessed the degree to which par-
ticipants believed they deserved to fail an impending NVR test.
Second, because recalling bad (vs. good) breaks affects not only
people’s self-evaluations but also their negative affect (cf. Studies
1b and 4), it is not clear if claiming excuses (e.g., feeling stressed
and tired) ahead of an ability test represents self-handicapping per
se or participants’ actual experiences of negative affect brought
about by remembering their recent bad breaks. To address this
potential issue, in Study 3b we crossed a manipulation of recalling
bad/good breaks with a manipulation of whether participants
learned that mitigating circumstances were known to negatively
affect test performance or not (cf. Hendrix & Hirt, 2009; McCrea
& Hirt, 2011). Claiming excuses, such as feeling tired and stressed,
provides a valid handicap for poor performance when such miti-
gating circumstances matter, but not when they do not matter.
Thus, if recalling bad breaks affects participants’ self-
handicapping and not simply their reporting of negative affect,
then we expected that recalling bad (vs. good) breaks would affect
participants’ claimed excuses for potential poor performance only
when they were told that mitigating circumstances were known to
have detrimental effects on performance. Finally, we included
pre-measured trait self-esteem for two reasons: (1) to ensure the
reasoning test was perceived in such a way that participants lower
in self-esteem engaged in more self-handicapping with the perfor-
mance context we used (cf. Finez et al., 2012; Tice, 1991); and (2),
consequently, as a covariate to take account of individual variation
in the propensity for people low in self-esteem to report feeling
stressed, tired, etc. under potentially threatening situations (see
Spalding & Hardin, 1999).
Method
Study 3a.
Participants. We approached 62 people at various locations
around the University of Essex to complete a “non-verbal reason-
ing” study. Two participants were not included in analyses because
they completed the PnR lottery after the dependent measures.
Another participant returned a blank questionnaire. The resulting
sample consisted of 32 males and 27 females (Mage  22.22 years,
SDage  5.28). Participants were given a small candy bar and £3
for their participation.
Materials and procedure. Upon agreeing to participate for a
small candy bar, we gave participants a questionnaire package, the
cover sheet of which contained a consent form and the same PnR
lottery procedure used in Study 1a. After giving their consent and
winning or losing the PnR lottery, participants completed an easy,
intermediate, and hard item taken from Raven’s (1938) Standard
Progressive Matrices, ostensibly as practice for an upcoming
“real” test of their intelligence. To facilitate the credibility of the
cover story, the experimenter held additional questionnaires in
view of the participant, ostensibly the upcoming test, on which
were printed further matrices.
Following the practice items, participants circled whether they
won or lost the PnR lottery. On the same sheet of paper was a
“Mitigating Factors” questionnaire. Participants read:
Research shows that performance on standardized IQ tests, such as the
one you are about to take, can be negatively influenced by a number
of factors other than your actual ability (e.g., lack of sleep, stress). So
that we can account for the presence of such mitigating factors in our
analysis, please answer the following questions.
As our measure of claimed self-handicapping (cf. Hendrix & Hirt,
2009; Spalding & Hardin, 1999), participants then rated the extent
to which they currently felt tired, alert, well-rested, focused, and
stressed (1  not at all, 7  very much). Participants also indi-
cated how many hours sleep they had the previous night (open-
ended). Because the hours of sleep item was scaled differently
from the remaining items, all items were standardized and aver-
aged to form our measure of self-handicapping (higher values
denote more self-handicapping;   .74). Finally, participants
were informed they would not actually be taking an intelligence
test, debriefed, and paid £3 regardless of the outcome of the PnR
lottery.
Study 3b.
Participants. Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s
MTurk (N  367, 33% male, 0.5% unreported; Mage  33.67
years, SDage  13.00).
Materials and procedure. Participants learned the study con-
cerned “daily experiences, aspects of personality, and non-verbal
reasoning ability, a component of general intelligence (or IQ).”
Participants first completed Rosenberg’s SES (with the items rated
on a 4-point scale ranging from 1  strongly disagree to 4 
strongly agree) and, to facilitate the credibility of the cover story,
the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, &
Swann, 2003). Next, participants learned about the upcoming
non-verbal reasoning test, and completed the same three practice
IQ test items from Study 3a.
Participants then completed the “daily experiences” part of the
study, where they recalled either 4 good breaks or 4 bad breaks. To
manipulate whether mitigating factors mattered or did not matter,
participants then completed either an “additional factors question-
naire” or a “mitigating factors questionnaire.” Both questionnaires
were the same except for the instructions given. In the “mitigating
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circumstances matter” condition, participants read the same in-
structions from Study 3a about how mitigating factors can affect
test performance. In the “mitigating circumstances do not matter”
condition, participants read:
Research shows that performance on standardized IQ tests, such as the
one you are about to take, is not influenced by factors other than your
actual ability. In keeping with convention, however, it is necessary for
us to ask you about these factors, although they are very unlikely to
influence your performance on the test. So that we can keep a record
of these factors for comparison with other surveys, please answer the
following questions:
Below these instructions were the same self-handicapping items
used in Study 3a (which were standardized and averaged across the
items;   .81). Next, participants completed a questionnaire
designed to assess their feelings about how deserving they felt of
failing the upcoming IQ test (see Table 1; 1  strongly disagree,
7  strongly agree). Before completing the questionnaire, partic-
ipants read: “We are also interested in people’s general beliefs and
feelings about their anticipated performance on the non-verbal
reasoning test. Please answer the following questions.” All seven
items from this Deservingness of Failing Ability Test Scale loaded
onto a single principal component (eigenvalue  4.20, 59.85% of
the variance accounted for;   .89; see Table 1).
Finally, participants provided demographic information and, as
a check on the mitigating circumstances matter manipulation,
completed the item: “To what extent do you believe mitigating
circumstances affect people’s test performances on ability tests?”
(1  not at all, 7  a great deal).
Results
Study 3a. An independent samples t-test showed that partic-
ipants who experienced a bad break during the PnR self-
handicapped to a greater extent (M  0.20, SD  0.63) than
participants who experienced a good break (M  0.21, SD 
0.64), t(57)  2.44, p  .018, d  0.64.
Study 3b.
Manipulation check. A 2 (Breaks Recalled: good vs. bad) 
2 (Mitigating Circumstances: matter vs. do not matter) ANOVA on
the manipulation check item confirmed that participants in the
“mitigating circumstances matter” condition believed mitigating
circumstances affect people’s test performances on ability tests to
a greater extent (M  5.28, SD  1.36) than participants in the
“mitigating circumstances do not matter” condition (M  4.59,
SD  1.56), F(1, 361)  20.00, p  .001, p2  .052. No other
effects were significant (ps  .56).
Self-handicapping and perceived deservingness of failing test.
Claimed self-handicapping was analyzed using a 2 (Breaks Re-
called: good vs. bad) 2 (Mitigating Circumstances: matter vs. do
not matter) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with pre-measured
self-esteem as a covariate. These analyses revealed one substantial
outlier (studentized deleted residual  4.66; Cook’s D that was
13.43 SD above the mean of Cook’s D) that was not included in
this analysis. Including this data results in a weaker interaction
effect for self-handicapping, F(1, 362)  3.77, p  .053, p2 
.01(see below).
The ANCOVA revealed a significant relation between self-
esteem and participants’ self-handicapping, F(1, 361)  78.11,
p  .001, r12  .41, p2  .178, such that lower self-esteem
related to higher ratings of claimed self-handicapping overall (cf.
Spalding & Hardin, 1999). Analyses also revealed a significant
Breaks Recalled  Mitigating Circumstances interaction for self-
handicapping, F(1, 361)  5.06, p  .025, p2  .014. Shown in
Figure 4, participants who recalled bad (vs. good) breaks self-
handicapped to a greater extent when mitigating circumstances
mattered, t(361)  3.38, p  .001, but not when mitigating
circumstances did not matter, t(361)  0.20, p  .80.
The same ANCOVA with beliefs about deserving to fail the
upcoming test as the dependent variable revealed a significant
effect of self-esteem, F(1, 362)  260.01, p  .001, r12  .64,
p2  .418, such that lower self-esteem related to greater beliefs
about deserving to fail the test (cf. Studies 1a, 1b, and 4). Analyses
also revealed a significant Breaks Recalled  Mitigating Circum-
stances interaction for beliefs about deserving to fail the test, F(1,
362) 5.38, p .021, p2  .015. Figure 5 shows that participants
who recalled bad (vs. good) breaks believed they deserved to fail
the test to a greater extent when mitigating circumstances mat-
tered, t(361)  2.63, p  .01, but not when mitigating circum-
stances did not matter, t(361)  0.65, p  .51.
Moderated mediation analyses. Beliefs about deserving to
fail the ability test correlated significantly with self-handicapping
(r  .41, p  .001). Following Preacher, Rucker, and Hayes’s
(2007) bootstrapping procedure for testing conditional indirect
effects (Model 2), we explored whether deservingness beliefs
mediated the effect of recalled good versus bad breaks on claimed
self-handicapping depending on whether participants were told
that mitigating circumstances mattered or did not matter. Using
10,000 resamples, analyses showed that beliefs about deserving to
fail the test significantly mediated the effect of recalled breaks on
self-handicapping when mitigating circumstances mattered (indi-
Figure 4. Effect of recalling bad versus good breaks on self-handicapping
ahead of an intelligence test as a function of whether participants learned
that mitigating circumstances affect test performance or not. Error bars
show standard errors of the means.
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rect effect  .04, 95% BCa CI [.01, .10]) but not when mitigating
circumstances did not matter (indirect effect.01, 95% BCa CI
[–.06, .02]).
The pattern of findings in Study 3 resonates with research
showing that self-handicapping results from evaluative concerns
about failure in situations known to increase such concerns (e.g.,
public self-focus, prevention focus; Hendrix & Hirt, 2009; Hirt,
McCrea, & Kimble, 2000). We extend this work, however, by
showing that (a) these concerns can reflect people’s perceived
deservingness of failing when mitigating circumstances matter and
(b) even recalling/experiencing random misfortunes is sufficient to
trigger this process.
Study 4: Recalling Good/Bad Breaks and Evaluations
by Others
Studies 1a and 1b showed that participants who experienced/
recalled bad (vs. good) breaks devalued their self-worth and be-
lieved they were more deserving of bad outcomes, and Study 3b
showed that these processes contributed to claimed self-
handicapping. Study 4 builds on these findings by examining
another potential consequence of these changes in how people
view their self-worth and deservingness: preferring that others
appraise them negatively. A large body of research from self-
verification theory (e.g., Swann, 2012; Swann, Rentfrow, &
Guinn, 2002) has convincingly demonstrated that people are mo-
tivated to see that others view them as they view themselves, even
if those self-views are negative. For example, Swann, Wenzlaff,
Krull, and Pelham (1992) found that participants with negative
self-views preferred that their dating partners and friends viewed
them less favorably than participants with positive self-views.
Although such strivings for self-verification are generally adap-
tive, in many instances they can be costly, such as when individ-
uals with unrealistic negative self-views gravitate toward relation-
ships (e.g., abusive partners) and situations (e.g., frustrating work
environments; Wiesenfeld, Swann, Brockner, & Bartel, 2007) that
further undermine their self-esteem (see Swann, 2012).
In Study 4, participants rated their specific beliefs about them-
selves, recalled either their recent good or bad breaks, and then
rated how they wanted their close friends to view them. On the
basis of the findings from Study 1b and the self-verification
literature, we predicted that controlling for participants’ self-
views, participants who recalled their recent bad breaks would
prefer that their close friends viewed them less favorably than
participants who recalled their good breaks.
Method
Participants. Students from the University of Essex partici-
pated in a laboratory experiment for £3 or partial course credit
(N  85, 38.8% male; Mage  20.56 years, SDage  2.90).
Materials and procedure. Participants were informed that
the study concerned “personality and life events.” They first com-
pleted a Self-Attributes Questionnaire (SAQ; Pelham & Swann,
1989), which served as our pre-measure of trait self-esteem. For
the SAQ, we asked participants to rate their attitudes about their
activities and abilities relative to other university students their
own age and gender using a 10-point scale ranging from Bottom
5% to Upper 5%. Participants provided self-ratings for 10 attri-
butes/abilities: intellectual ability, social skills/social competence,
artistic and/or musical ability, athletic ability, physical attractive-
ness, leadership ability, common sense, emotional stability, sense
of humor, and discipline. The SAQ showed acceptable internal
consistency (  .73).
Next, participants completed a “life experiences questionnaire”
where they recalled either 4 good breaks or 4 bad breaks (per
Study 1b). Finally, they completed a “preferred appraisal by oth-
ers” questionnaire that asked them to rate how they wanted their
good friends to view them in terms of the same 10 attributes/
abilities that they previously self-rated (  .83) and a general
appraisal by others item: “Ideally, I would like my good friends to
view me:” (1  very negatively, 8  very positively). The specific
appraisal and general appraisal scales correlated significantly (r 
.29, p .006) and were averaged to form one measure of appraisal
by others scale (the general appraisals item was rescaled to a
10-point scale for this purpose). Higher values indicate greater
preferences for close friends to view the self positively. Finally,
participants completed the items from the PANAS (s .87) used
in Study 1.
Results
We ran an ANCOVA on participants’ preferred appraisals by
their good friends with breaks recalled as a between-subjects factor
and self-appraisals as a covariate. One participant did not complete
the SAQ and was therefore not included in these analyses. Con-
sistent with findings from the self-verification literature (Swann,
2012), there was a significant relation between participants’ self-
appraisals and their preferred appraisals by others, F(1, 81) 
67.86, p .001, r12  .64, such that the less favorable participants
viewed their own attributes/abilities overall, the less they preferred
their close friends to view them favorably. Shown in Table 3, the
manipulation of breaks recalled also exerted a significant effect:
Figure 5. Effect of recalling bad versus good breaks on beliefs about
deserving to fail the upcoming intelligence test as a function of whether
participants learned that mitigating circumstances affect test performance
or not. Error bars show standard errors of the means.
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participants who recalled their bad breaks wanted their good
friends to view them more negatively than participants who re-
called their good breaks. This pattern of results was similar when
the specific appraisals by friends and general appraisal by friends
measures were analyzed separately.
ANCOVAs with self-appraisals as a covariate were performed
to test the effect of recalling good or bad breaks on negative and
positive affect. These analyses revealed a significant effect of
recalled breaks on negative affect but not positive affect (see Table
3). The main effect of breaks on appraisals by close friends
reported above held in a similar ANCOVA that also included
positive and negative affect as covariates, F(1, 79)  10.43, p 
.002. This finding suggests that the effect of recalling good/bad
breaks on participants’ preferred appraisal by their close friends is
not specifically due to changes in general affect.
Study 5: Self-Esteem, Deserving Bad Outcomes, and
Evaluations by Others
Our previous studies showed consistent evidence that experi-
encing/recalling random and uncontrollable negative outcomes can
change how people view their self-worth and beliefs about deserv-
ing bad outcomes, and these changes had demonstrable effects on
how people wanted others to evaluate their personal worth and
self-handicapping. Providing experimental evidence for the rela-
tion between self-esteem and beliefs about deserving bad out-
comes, Study 2b showed that a manipulation of participants’
self-worth led them to deem a procedure that ultimately disadvan-
taged them as more fair/reasonable. In Study 4, we found that
participants who recalled their bad (vs. good) breaks preferred that
their close friends evaluated them more negatively. This finding
indicates that not only can random breaks affect participants’
self-evaluations and perceived deservingness of bad outcomes (cf.
Studies 1a and 1b), they can also influence corresponding judg-
ments about how people want others to evaluate their attributes
and qualities. In our final three studies, we augmented these
experimental findings by capitalizing on existing individual vari-
ation in chronic self-esteem and beliefs about deserving bad out-
comes to test the hypothesis that one of the reasons why self-
esteem relates to self-defeating behaviors is because people lower
in self-esteem generally believe they deserve bad outcomes (see
Studies 2a and 2b).
In Study 5, we took an individual differences approach to zero
in on deservingness as a process variable in the relation between
low self-esteem and preferring that others view the self less favor-
ably. We hypothesized that individual differences in self-esteem
would positively, and beliefs about deserving bad outcomes would
negatively, predict the extent to which participants wanted others
to view them favorably. We also hypothesized that beliefs about
deserving bad outcomes would feature in an indirect effect of
self-esteem and the degree to which people wanted others to view
them favorably.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited via Amazon’s
MTurk to complete a survey about their personality and experi-
ences (N  142, 56% male; Mage  32.73 years, SDage  11.64).
Materials and procedure. Participants first completed
Rosenberg’s (1965) SES, using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree) for each item. Next, participants
completed a nine-item scale we designed to measure participants’
general beliefs about deserving bad outcomes. The items were
rated using a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6
(strongly agree). Shown in Table 1, this scale was adapted from
the scale we developed for Study 1b, but the items were framed in
general terms rather than how participants felt at the moment. A
principal component analysis revealed only one substantive com-
ponent explaining participants’ responses (eigenvalue  4.41,
48.96% of the variance accounted for). These analyses were con-
ducted on the collated data from Studies 5, 6, and 7 (these studies
used the same deservingness of bad outcomes measure; total N 
461). An additional component was extracted from this analysis
(eigenvalue  1.32) but inspection of the loadings revealed no
consistent or meaningful pattern among the items (i.e., a mix of
positive and negative loadings).
Finally, participants completed a four-item measure assessing
the degree to which they wanted others to view them favorably
(see Swann, n.d.). These items were similar to the self-esteem
items but were framed in terms of how the participants wanted
others to view them (e.g., “I want others to have a positive attitude
toward me”; “I want others to see that I am able to accomplish
what I do”). The items were rated using a scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).
Results
Shown in Table 4, correlation analyses showed that self-esteem,
beliefs about deserving bad outcomes, and desired evaluations by
others all correlated significantly with each other in the predicted
directions. Multiple regression analyses regressing the desire for
others to view one favorably onto self-esteem and beliefs about
Table 3
Adjusted Means for the Measures Employed in Study 4 by Breaks Condition and Intercorrelations Among the Measures
Measures
Recalled breaks manipulation Intercorrelations
Bad breaks Good breaks F p2 1 2 3 4
1. Self-appraisals (premeasured) —
2. Preferred appraisals by others 7.87 (0.09) 8.30 (0.092) 10.69 .12 .64 —
3. Negative affect 1.72 (0.088) 1.39 (0.090) 7.02 .08 .38 .33 —
4. Positive affect 3.00 (0.125) 3.14 (0.128) 0.65 .01 .33 .11 .14 —
Note. Higher values indicate more of each construct. Standard errors of the adjusted means are presented in parentheses.
 p  .01.
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deserving bad outcomes revealed only deservingness as a signifi-
cant predictor (see Figure 6). Bootstrapped mediation analyses
(10,000 resamples) showed that beliefs about deserving bad out-
comes was a significant mediator of the relation between self-
esteem and wanting others to view the self favorably (indirect
effect  .21, 95% BCa CI [.09, .34]). Adding to our Study 4
experimental findings, these findings indicate that a concern for
deservingness is one mechanism that moves people from “I’m a
bad person” to “I want others to view me negatively,” because, as
we have argued and demonstrated experimentally (Studies 2a and
2b), people low in self-esteem feel more deserving of bad out-
comes. Crucially, these results provided evidence that a concern
with deservingness is one mechanism that links self-esteem to the
desire for favorable evaluations by others.
Study 6: Self-Esteem, Deserving Bad Outcomes,
Thoughts of Self-Harm, and Self-Handicapping
In Study 6, we focused on the mediating role that deservingness
plays in the links between self-esteem and habitual self-
handicapping and self-esteem and thoughts of self-harm. As men-
tioned, a large body of research has shown that people lower in
self-esteem tend to engage in more habitual self-handicapping
(e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1998). The habitual or chronic self-
handicapper is someone who engages in a variety of behavioral
and claimed excuses, such as withdrawing from achievement con-
texts, procrastination, and engaging in behaviors that are harmful
in and of themselves (e.g., alcohol and drug consumption; see
Zuckerman & Tsai, 2005). Our theoretical perspective suggests
that one of the reasons why people low in self-esteem might
self-handicap is because they believe they deserve bad outcomes.
That is, we argue that people might engage in patterns of self-
handicapping behavior to justify their beliefs that they deserve bad
outcomes in life. If there is merit in this analysis, then we would
expect individual differences in beliefs about deserving bad out-
comes to statistically mediate the relation between self-esteem and
chronic self-handicapping.
Physical self-harm has also been linked repeatedly to low self-
esteem (e.g., Hawton, Rodham, Evans, & Weatherall, 2002; for a
review, see Klonsky & Muelenkamp, 2007). But how does one
move from believing “I’m a bad person” to “I want to harm
myself”? Given our theoretical perspective and previous findings,
we argue that deservingness might be one potent mechanism that
allows people to move from self-derogation to thoughts of self-
harming—that is, individuals who entertain thoughts of self-harm
and engage in self-harming behaviors do so, in part, because they
feel they deserve bad outcomes in life. This analysis fits well with
research showing that self-punishment is one of the most prevalent
reasons given by self-injurers for their self-injury (Klonsky, 2007;
Nock, 2009). According to this self-punishment hypothesis, people
engage in self-harm because it “provides a vehicle for punishing
oneself for some perceived wrongdoing or responding to general
self-hatred or self-deprecation” (Nock, 2010, p. 352). In support of
this view, self-injury patients often report that one of the reasons
why they self-injure is because they perceive themselves as bad
Table 4
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations for Measures Employed in Studies 5, 6, and 7
Measures M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
Study 5
1. Self-esteem 4.47 (1.00) (.94)
2. Deserve bad outcomes 2.56 (0.81) .70 (.86)
3. Favorable evaluations by others 5.01 (0.80) .42 .49 (.93)
Study 6
1. Self-esteem 3.09 (0.59) (.89)
2. Deserve bad outcomes 2.47 (0.94) .69 (.88)
3. PHQ-8 1.97 (0.69) .62 .55 (.85)
4. Thoughts of self-harm 1.40 (0.79) .46 .53 .64 (.85)
5. SHS 3.13 (0.82) .54 .58 .56 .39 (.85)
Study 7
1. Self-esteem 3.12 (0.50) (.85)
2. Deserve bad outcomes 2.39 (0.78) .69 (.85)
3. Self-reward 0 (1.00) .11 .17 —
4. Self-punish 0 (1.00) .21 .30 .43 —
5. % correct on IQ test 59 (21) .11 .20 .28 .17 —
Note. Higher values indicate more of each construct. Self-esteem was assessed on a 6-point scale in Study 5 and on a 4-point scale in Studies 6 and 7.
Where applicable, alpha reliabilities are presented in parentheses along the diagonal. PHQ-8  Patient Health Questionnaire–8; SHS  Self-Handicapping
Scale.
 p  .05.  p  .01.
Figure 6. Mediational model predicting the preference for others to
evaluate oneself favorably from beliefs about deserving bad outcomes and
self-esteem (Study 5). Values show unstandardized path coefficients.  p
.05.
154 CALLAN, KAY, AND DAWTRY
and deserving of suffering (e.g., Adams, Rodham, & Gavin, 2005;
Favazza, 1996; Walsh, 2006). This research, however, has been
predominately descriptive and involving clinical samples. To our
knowledge, little empirical work has examined the role that beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes play in the links between low
self-esteem and people’s thoughts of self-harm. Nevertheless,
Nock (2010) states in his review of the clinical self-injury litera-
ture that achieving a better understanding of the psychological
processes involved in these phenomena “represents an essential
direction for future research” (p. 353).
To this end, along with chronic self-handicapping, we assessed
participants’ self-esteem, beliefs about deserving bad outcomes in
life, and how often they thought of harming themselves over the
previous two weeks. We predicted that beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes would mediate the relation between self-esteem and
thoughts of self-harm and self-esteem and chronic self-
handicapping. Because both chronic self-handicapping and self-
harming have been found to correlate with depression (e.g., Haw-
ton, Saunders, & O’Connor, 2012; Klonsky & Muelenkamp, 2007;
Zuckerman & Tsai, 2005), we also included a measure of depres-
sive symptomatology to explore the role that beliefs about deserv-
ing bad outcomes play in chronic self-handicapping and thoughts
of self-harm over and above depression. That is, we tested whether
beliefs about deserving bad outcomes uniquely predict thoughts of
self-harm and chronic self-handicapping while controlling for de-
pression.
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited online via Amazon’s
MTurk (N  139, 29.5% male, 7.2% unreported; Mage  30.05
years, SDage  11.56).
Materials and procedure. Participants were informed that
they would complete a series of questionnaires that measured
various aspects of their personality and how they felt about them-
selves. Participants completed the following measures in order:
Rosenberg’s SES. Participants completed the 10-item Rosen-
berg’s SES. The items were rated using a scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree).
Deservingness of Bad Outcomes Scale (DBOS). Participants
completed the nine-item DBOS we developed for Study 3b (see
Table 1).
Patient Health Questionnaire–8 (PHQ-8). The PHQ-8 is an
eight-item measure designed to assess current depression in the
general population (Kroenke et al., 2009). Participants were in-
structed to indicate how often over the last 2 weeks they were
bothered by eight problems (e.g., “Feeling down, depressed, or
hopeless”; “Trouble concentrating on things such as reading the
newspaper or watching television”) using a scale ranging from 1
(not at all) to 4 (nearly every day). We used the average of the
PHQ-8 items to assess individual differences in depressive symp-
tomatology.
Thoughts of Self-Harm Scale. We constructed two items,
which appeared at the end of the PHQ-8, to gauge participants’
thoughts of self-harm over the last 2 weeks (“Thoughts of
harming, hurting, or injuring yourself” and “Wanting to expe-
rience physical pain”). As with the PHQ-8 items, these two
items were rated using a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4
(nearly every day). The two items were significantly correlated
(r  .74, p  .001) and were averaged to form one measure of
thoughts of self-harm.
Self-Handicapping Scale (SHS). A disposition to self-
handicap was measured using Rhodewalt’s (1990) 14-item
SHS. The SHS assesses a variety of self-handicapping behav-
iors (e.g., “I suppose I feel ‘under the weather’ more often than
most people”; “I tend to put things off until the last moment”),
and has been shown to predict self-handicapping behaviors in a
variety of contexts (Rhodewalt, 1990; Zuckerman et al., 1998).
The items were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 6 (strongly agree); responses were averaged to
form one measure of a disposition to self-handicap.
Finally, after completing the measures participants were pre-
sented with a debriefing screen that included links to online
resources if they felt they might be experiencing symptoms of
depression (e.g., http://www.mentalhealthamerica.net/).
Results
Shown in Table 4, correlation analyses showed that all of the
measures correlated significantly with each other. Of note, both
self-esteem and beliefs about deserving bad outcomes corre-
lated significantly with thoughts of self-harm and self-
handicapping.
Separate multiple regression analyses regressing thoughts of
self-harm and self-handicapping onto the remaining measures
revealed that only beliefs about deserving bad outcomes and
depression uniquely predicted thoughts of self-harm and self-
handicapping (see Table 5). These findings—that beliefs about
deserving bad outcomes significantly predict thoughts of self-
harm and self-handicapping over and above depression—are
important because they suggest that rather than simply being a
derivative or symptom of depression, deservingness beliefs
uniquely contribute to these self-defeating thoughts and behav-
iors.
We conducted mediation analyses to examine whether beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes mediated the links between
self-esteem and thoughts of self-harm and self-esteem and
self-handicapping. Shown in Figure 7, bootstrapping analyses
with 10,000 resamples showed that beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes significantly mediated the relations between self-
Table 5
Summary of Multiple Regression Analyses Predicting Thoughts
of Self-Harm and Self-Handicapping (Study 6)
Predictor variables
Thoughts of
self-harm Self-handicapping
b SE 	 b SE 	
1. Self-esteem .10 .13 .07 .16 .14 .12
2. Deserve bad outcomes .27 .08 .32 .31 .09 .35
3. PHQ-8 .62 .10 .54 .40 .12 .34
4. Self-handicapping .07 .08 .07
5. Thoughts of self-harm .07 .09 .07
Overall statistics F(4, 130)  27.35,
p  .01, R2  .46
F(4, 130)  24.85,
p  .01, R2  .43
Note. PHQ-8  Patient Health Questionnaire–8.
 p  .01.
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esteem and thoughts of self-harm (indirect effect  .38, 95%
BCa CI [–.62, –.20]) and self-esteem and chronic self-
handicapping (indirect effect  .39, 95% BCa CI [–.60,
–.21]). Further analyses showed that including depressive affect
(PHQ-8) as a covariate in these bootstrapped mediation analy-
ses did not change the significant indirect relations between
self-esteem and thoughts of self-harm (indirect effect  .22,
95% BCa CI [–.43, –.10]) and self-esteem and self-
handicapping (indirect effect  .26, 95% BCa CI [–.45,
–.12]) through deserving bad outcomes. These findings show
that beliefs about deserving bad outcomes mediate the relations
between self-esteem and thoughts of self-harm and self-esteem
and self-handicapping over and above the influence of depres-
sion.
Study 7: Self-Esteem, Deserving Bad Outcomes, and
Self-Punishment
Study 6 showed that one of the reasons why people entertain
thoughts of self-harm is because they feel deserving of bad
outcomes. In Study 7 we aimed to extend these findings by
measuring actual self-punishment using a modified paradigm
from the clinical literature (Roth, Rehm, & Rozensky, 1980;
Rozensky, Rehm, Pry, & Roth, 1977). For example, Roth et al.
(1980) found that mildly depressed participants were more
willing to self-administer an aversive buzzer sound for believ-
ing they made incorrect responses during a memory test than
participants lower in depression. We used a similar paradigm
where after each question of an intelligence test, participants
were given the choice to self-reward (receive positive feed-
back), self-punish (receive negative feedback), or receive no
feedback if they believed they got the question correct or
incorrect. As in our previous studies, we measured participants’
self-esteem and beliefs about deserving bad outcomes before
they completed the intelligence test. We predicted that partic-
ipants lower in self-esteem would choose to receive negative
feedback more often, and, importantly, that beliefs about de-
serving bad outcomes would statistically underlie this relation.
Method
Participants. Two samples of participants were recruited to
partake in either a laboratory study or an online study. One
sample consisted of 77 staff and students from the University of
Essex, United Kingdom, who were recruited through a research
participant database (55% females; Mage  21.25 years,
SDage  3.72). They were paid £3 for their participation. The
other sample consisted of 103 participants recruited via MTurk
to complete an online survey for a nominal payment (59%
females, 1% unreported; Mage  33.32 years, SDage  11.83).
Materials and procedure. Participants from both samples
were told that the study involved a pilot test of a new short-form
NVR test. Ostensibly as an unrelated study, participants com-
pleted a “personality” study where they completed Rosenberg’s
(1965) SES and the nine-item DBOS from Study 6 (see Table
1). Participants from the laboratory sample completed these
scales online at the point of registering for the study (i.e., prior
to arriving to the laboratory), whereas participants in the online
sample completed these measures immediately before complet-
ing the NVR test.
Participants then completed a computer-based NVR test,
which involved solving a series of Raven’s (1938) matrices (see
Studies 3a and 3b). For each matrix, participants were required
to identify, from eight possible choices, the missing piece
required to complete the pattern in accordance with the rule
specified in the instructions. Participants in the online sample
completed 12 matrices, whereas participants in the laboratory
sample completed 20 matrices.
Participants first read instructions on how to complete the
task and were shown an example matrix. On each trial, partic-
ipants were first presented with a matrix set for a maximum of
20 s or until the advance button was pressed. A countdown
timer was displayed on the screen. After providing their answer,
participants were taken to an answer screen where the matrix set
was no longer visible. They were then required to select the
number (from 1 to 8) representing their chosen answer.
Participants were then taken to a further screen where they were
given an opportunity to reward or punish themselves on the basis
of whether they believed they had responded correctly to the
matrix (no performance feedback was provided during the task).
Specifically, participants were told:
If you believe your response was correct, please reward yourself by
pressing the “Reward” button. If you believe your response was
incorrect, please punish yourself by pressing the “Punish” button.
If you are unsure if you gave the correct response, please press the
“Unsure” button.
Figure 7. Mediational models predicting thoughts of self-harm and
chronic self-handicapping (Study 6) and choosing to self-punish during an
intelligence test (Study 7) from beliefs about deserving bad outcomes and
self-esteem. Values show unstandardized path coefficients.  p  .05.
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When “Reward” was selected, participants were shown a feed-
back screen for 1 s displaying the text “Well Done!” in large
green font, and the next trial began. If “Punish” was selected,
participants were shown “You’re Wrong!!” in large red font.
Selecting “unsure” advanced to the next trial without displaying
any feedback. The number of times participants opted to select
the “punish” option served as our measure of self-punishment.4
Results
Because participants across samples completed a different num-
ber of items during the NVR test (20 and 12), participants’ choices
to self-punish and self-reward were standardized within samples
prior to analyses. As might be expected, self-punishment was
relatively uncommon overall, with participants choosing to self-
punish on average 2.45 and 0.65 times in the laboratory and online
samples, respectively (differences between samples here reflect the
overall difficulty of the two NVR tests, with the laboratory sample
including more difficult Raven’s matrices).
Preliminary moderated multiple regression analyses revealed
that the correlations between self-esteem and self-punishment and
deserving bad outcomes and self-punishment did not differ signif-
icantly between the samples (ps  .72), so the data were collated
and analyzed together. Shown in Table 4, correlation analyses
showed that both self-esteem and beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes correlated significantly with the number of times partic-
ipants chose to self-punish, such that lower self-esteem and
higher beliefs about deserving bad outcomes related to more
self-punishment. A multiple regression analysis regressing self-
punishment onto self-esteem and deserving bad outcomes as pre-
dictors revealed one substantial outlier who was removed from
analyses (studentized deleted residual  5.16; Cook’s D that was
9.95 SD above the mean of Cook’s D). Including these data reveal
similar correlations between self-esteem and self-punishment
(r  .19, p  .01) and deserving bad outcomes and self-
punishment (r  .25, p  .01) as those reported in Table 4.
Interestingly, shown in Table 4, beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes correlated negatively with test performance (i.e., per-
centage correct). The correlations with self-reward were weaker
overall (cf. Roth et al., 1980), with only deserving bad outcomes
correlating significantly with self-reward.
Bootstrapped mediation analyses (10,000 resamples) showed
that beliefs about deserving bad outcomes statistically mediated
the relation between self-esteem and self-punishment (see Figure
7; indirect effect  .39, 95% BCa CI [–.70, –.15]). This pattern
remained largely unchanged when test performance was included
as a covariate (indirect effect  .34, 95% BCa CI [–.62, –.11]).
Moreover, multiple regression analyses with self-esteem and per-
centage correct on the test as predictors of self-punishment showed
that the c path (self-esteem to self-punishment) remained signifi-
cant while controlling for percentage correct on the test (B  .37,
	  .19, SE  .14, p  .009). Multiple regression analyses
showed that the a path (self-esteem to deserving bad outcomes)
also remained significant while controlling for test performance
(B  1.05, 	  .68, SE  .08, p  .001). The finding that this
mediation pattern holds while controlling for test performance
suggests that participants higher in beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes were engaging in self-punishment and not simply con-
cluding that they got the questions wrong. Importantly, these
findings extend our Study 6 results by showing that concerns about
deservingness play a role in how people move from the perception
of lower personal worth to actually choosing to receive self-
punishment.
General Discussion
A long history of social psychological research has convincingly
demonstrated that people are motivated to view their world as
orderly and predictable (Kay et al., 2008)—a world where both
they and others get what they deserve and deserve what they get
(Lerner, 1980). The present work tested the idea that people who
are lower in self-esteem might engage in self-defeating behaviors
because they feel deserving of bad outcomes, even if those out-
comes are brought about by chance and happenstance.
Findings from seven studies provided evidence for this idea.
Participants who experienced/recalled random bad (vs. good)
breaks devalued their state self-worth, which, in turn, increased
their beliefs about deserving bad outcomes (Studies 1a and 1b).
Across our studies we found consistent evidence that self-
esteem and beliefs about deservingness are highly related—bad
(good) people deserve bad (good) outcomes. Study 2a offered
experimental evidence for this link between self-esteem and per-
sonal deservingness by showing that a manipulation of self-worth
led participants to deem a completely random and uncontrollable
bad (good) break as more (less) fair and reasonable. That is, in
spite of how seemingly irrational such judgments might be, par-
ticipants reported a random and uncontrollable bad or good break
as more or less fair if they received feedback that they failed or
succeeded an intelligence test. Of course, from a rational perspec-
tive, such notions as “fairness” and “deserving” ought not to come
into play when considering one’s chance outcomes—after all, such
events are by definition unforeseeable and uncontrollable—but in
light of the functional significance of the motive to view one’s
outcomes as deserved rather than random, the fact that people
might be moved to deem their bad breaks as deserved as a function
of their self-worth becomes less puzzling. Study 2b extended this
finding in a different way by showing that recalling one’s least
favorable attributes (vs. control) increased the extent to which
participants believed they deserved bad outcomes in life.
These changes in participants’ state self-worth and perceived
deservingness had consequences for how participants (a) wanted
others to evaluate their personal worth and attributes (Study 4), and
(b) their self-handicapping behavior ahead of an ability test (3a
and 3b). In Study 4, participants who recalled their bad (vs. good)
breaks preferred that others appraised them less positively, and
Study 5 offered important mediational evidence that this process of
moving from “I’m a bad person” to “I want others to view me
negatively” is guided, in part, by participants’ feeling that they
deserve bad outcomes.
4 Participants in the laboratory sample also learned that they would be
completing a “mental dexterity” experiment after the NVR test during
which they would either construct a toy from an educational science kit or
write a short essay about the experience of making toys from such kits.
Whether participants learned they would construct the toys or write a short
essay did not significantly affect participants’ choices to self-punish or
self-reward during the NVR test (ps  .70).
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Study 3b showed that when mitigating circumstances mattered,
participants who experienced/recalled bad breaks claimed excuses
for potential failure during an ability test to a greater extent than
participants who experienced/recalled good breaks, and these ef-
fects were linked to participants self-evaluative concerns about
deserving to fail. In Study 6, we found that the same processes
operated when considering the link between trait self-esteem and
chronic self-handicapping: participants lower in self-esteem re-
ported chronic excuse-making and patterns of behavioral self-
handicapping partly because they felt deserving of bad outcomes
in life.
In our final two studies we investigated participants’ thoughts of
physical self-harm (Study 6) and self-punishing behavior (Study
7). In Study 6, beliefs about deserving bad outcomes mediated the
relation between self-esteem and thoughts of self-harm, and this
pattern held even when controlling for depression (which is a
major precursor to self-injurious thoughts and behaviors; Klonsky
& Muelenkamp, 2007). In Study 7, when given the choice to
self-reward, self-punish, or do nothing during an intelligence test,
participants lower in self-esteem opted to give themselves negative
feedback more often than participants higher in self-esteem. As in
our previous studies, beliefs about deserving bad outcomes statis-
tically mediated this relation between self-esteem and self-
defeating behavior.
Trade-Offs Between Deservingness and Self-Defeat
Across our studies we found that people adopted a variety of
beliefs and behaviors that are ultimately self-costly and self-
defeating. Indeed, wanting others to evaluate the self negatively
may lead some people to tolerate abusive partners (Swann, 2012),
self-handicapping leads to maladjustment over time (Zuckerman &
Tsai, 2005), and thoughts of self-harm can lead to actual direct
injuring of the body (Nock, 2010). As we noted at the start of our
article, these behaviors are at odds with the rationalistic view that
humans are primarily motivated by self-preservation and the pur-
suit of self-interest. Why, then, would people be willing to adopt
such self-defeating beliefs and behaviors? We put forward and
empirically tested the idea that people who adopt these beliefs and
engage in these behaviors do so, in part, because they are moti-
vated to sustain the sense that people—including oneself—get
what they deserve. Thus, our conceptual analysis and empirical
findings resonate with Baumeister and Scher’s (1988; see also
Baumeister, 1997) analysis that rather than being driven by a
motivation for primary self-destruction, people who engage in
self-defeating behaviors do so as a trade-off. In the case of the
current findings, the trade-off is between the adaptive and func-
tional belief that one’s world is fair, predictable, and orderly—a
belief that provides the enabling psychological context for people
to pursue their long-term goals with confidence (Callan, Harvey, &
Sutton, 2014; Callan, Shead, & Olson, 2009; Hafer, 2000; Laurin
et al., 2011)—and engaging in behaviors that are actually costly to
the self to sustain that belief. That is, the motivation to see that
people get what they deserve can lead to patterns of behavior that
are ultimately self-costly, even though they are the result of an
adaptive process that can be triggered by even random and uncon-
trollable negative life events.
Limitations and Future Directions
One of the strengths of our work is that we adopted a diverse set
of dependent measures and methods to triangulate on our hypoth-
eses, but this broad, multi-method approach came at the expense of
more focused investigations of the various self-defeating behavior
patterns we tested. Thus, we have only scratched the surface of the
various ways concerns about deservingness may play a role in
wanting others to evaluate the self less favorably, self-
handicapping, and self-harm over time and circumstance. In Stud-
ies 4 and 5, we found that people preferred others to evaluate them
less favorably when they recalled their recent bad breaks and
believed they deserved bad outcomes. What has yet to be inves-
tigated, however, is the extent to which these processes can con-
tribute to actual negative feedback seeking by people with more
negative self-views (e.g., actively choosing to receive negative
over positive feedback from close others; Swann, Hixon, & De La
Ronde, 1992). Such work may lead to an increased understanding
of the processes involved self-verification, including how the
perceived accuracy of social feedback might moderate the links
between self-esteem, perceived deservingness of bad outcomes,
and actual feedback seeking (see Bosson & Swann, 1999).
In Study 6 we found that concerns about deservingness was an
important predictor of self-handicapping. Using a longitudinal
design, Zuckerman and Tsai (2005) found that low self-esteem
related to more self-handicapping over time, but that the use of
self-handicapping also engendered a loss of self-esteem over time.
On the basis of our theoretical analysis and current findings, we
speculate that beliefs about deserving bad outcomes and self-
handicapping might also reinforce each other over time, such that
believing one deserves bad outcomes as a function of low self-
esteem can lead to patterns of self-handicapping behavior that
further diminishes one’s self-esteem and deservingness. Such lon-
gitudinal investigations might also speak further to the direction of
influence between self-esteem, deserving bad outcomes, and self-
defeat to supplement the current correlational and experimental
findings.
For the obvious ethical reasons, in Study 6 we examined par-
ticipants’ retrospective reports of their thoughts of self-harm rather
than their actual self-injurious behaviors. Of course, it is important
to investigate the reasons why people have recently thought about
physically harming themselves (see Nock, 2010), but recent meth-
odological advancements may allow future research to test the role
that deservingness plays in real time self-injurious thoughts and
behaviors (e.g., ecological momentary assessments with smart-
phones; see Nock, Prinstein, & Sterba, 2009). Such investigations
may lead to further evidence for the self-punishment hypothesis of
self-harm in addition to what we provided in the context of
retrospective thoughts of physical self-harm.
Our results are consistent with our theoretical analysis in that
participants, at least in the immediate context, engaged in self-
defeat following their experiences of random negative experiences,
and we provided evidence that one of the reasons they did so was
because of their concerns about deservingness. What our findings
do not speak to, however, are the accumulative, longer-term con-
sequences of bad breaks and other negative events on people’s
self-esteem, beliefs about deservingness, and patterns of self-
defeating behaviors. By and large, most of our participants did not
adopt self-defeating beliefs and engage in self-defeating behaviors
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in absolute terms, which reflects that fact that a large majority of
people evaluate themselves favorably (Diener & Diener, 1995).
That is, even though we showed changes in people’s self-esteem as
a function of their random and uncontrollable bad breaks, partic-
ipants generally did not feel deserving of bad outcomes or engage
in self-defeat, because their self-esteem was still within the posi-
tive range in absolute terms. In fact, it was generally only our
participants who were very low in self-esteem who, for example,
entertained thoughts of physical self-harm (Study 6) and opted to
punish themselves for potentially poor performance (Study 7).
What, then, might lead someone to hold especially high beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes in life? One possibility is that
although an experience of a single random bad event may influ-
ence people’s beliefs about deserving bad outcomes in the shorter-
term as we have shown, it is the “wear and tear” of constantly
experiencing bad breaks and other random and uncontrollable
negative life events on people’s self-evaluations and emotional
well-being (Charles, Piazza, Mogle, Sliwinski, & Almeida, 2013)
that lead people into more chronic beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes in life. Although we did not investigate these longer-
term consequences, we offered a theoretical perspective that
speaks to their importance, and we designed measures of beliefs
about deserving bad outcomes that could be used in future inves-
tigations of these processes.
Finally, from a deservingness perspective, the belief that one
deserves bad outcomes requires a less favorable view of the self.
Thus, we suspect that the effects we report here—that is, lower
self-esteem affects self-defeat through beliefs about deserving bad
outcomes—are likely limited to those self-defeating behaviors that
occur because of lower self-esteem or within contexts that are
self-evaluative or self-relevant (cf. Wood et al., 2009).5 Along
with identifying esteem-threat and emotional distress, Baumeister
(1997) highlighted how self-regulation failures can lead to self-
defeating behaviors. To the extent that people engage in some
forms of self-defeat because of, for example, a loss of impulse
control may have more to do with self-regulatory breakdown than
their concerns about deservingness. Nonetheless, our findings
complement Baumeister’s analysis by suggesting that perceived
deservingness of future bad outcomes, even in the wake of mun-
dane and uncontrollable bad breaks, is an important mechanism
underlying the link between low self-esteem and self-defeat.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Researchers interested in the psychology of justice and deserv-
ingness have highlighted how the motive to view one’s world as
stable and orderly can impact how they evaluate others’ outcomes
and deservingness, such as reasoning backward from a victim’s
random ill-fate to infer her personal worth (Lerner & Simmons,
1966) to perceiving “bad” people as deserving their random neg-
ative experiences (Callan et al., 2006). Much less research, how-
ever, has focused on whether the same processes operate in the
contexts of one’s own random experiences and deservingness. If
this motive is essential for people’s long-term goal pursuits, then
one might expect to find that people’s reactions to their own fates
as deserved might parallel their reactions to the fates of others as
deserved. In Lerner’s (1977) early conceptualizations of the justice
motive, deservingness for others and deservingness for the self are
intimately intertwined, as pursing one’s long-term goals with a
measure of confidence requires the belief that one’s social and
physical environment is such that outcomes are distributed to those
who deserve them rather than being governed by randomness.
Across seven studies, we provided empirical support for the idea
that in at least some contexts, a concern for deservingness for the
self affects people’s reactions to their own outcomes in much the
same way as they respond to the outcomes of others.
It is also interesting to consider how these processes may
manifest at the group level. System justification theory (Jost,
Banaji, & Nosek, 2004) has noted many examples of low-status
groups attributing their disadvantaged status to inferior abilities
and other characteristics of the ingroup, rather than pure discrim-
ination or misfortune. Because these examples of so-called ingroup
derogation are difficult to explain via prevalent models of social
identity, these phenomena have garnered considerable interest
from researchers. Some theorists explain ingroup derogation as the
result of powerful groups convincing the less powerful to buy into
legitimizing myths that justify extant power differences (Sidanius
& Pratto, 1999)—that is, they explain it as resulting from the
motivations and goals of high-status group members and their
efforts to preserve their power and advantage. Another possibility,
however, and one that is entirely consistent with theoretical treat-
ments of system justification theory (Jost et al., 2004), is that cases
of ingroup derogation may also be due to motivations on the part
of the disadvantaged group members themselves—namely, their
motivations to preserve general beliefs in deservingness. The re-
search reported here, although limited to individual-level phenom-
ena, speaks to the feasibility of this latter account.
Besides their theoretical importance, our findings point to pos-
sible intervention and treatment strategies for people seeking help
for their self-defeating beliefs and behaviors (e.g., self-injurers).
That is, the current findings offer empirical support for the poten-
tial importance of considering an individual’s beliefs about deserv-
ing bad outcomes as one source of his or her patterns of self-
defeating behavior. Of course, more research is needed on these
practical applications of the current findings, but helping clients
understand how their concerns about personal deservingness might
influence their self-harming behavior may prove to complement
existing treatment strategies.
5 Indeed, two initial studies unexpectedly revealed that self-esteem did
not correlate significantly with how much participants were willing to
self-administer electrical stimulations (r  .04, p  .77; N  54) or taste
hot sauce (	  .002, p  .49, controlling for liking of hot sauce and
expectations of hotness; N  60). Thus, in light of the current findings, it
is important to consider patterns of self-defeating behaviors that are rele-
vant to participants’ self-views for experiences of misfortune or deserv-
ingness to serve as contributing factors.
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